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Abstract:
This paper contributes to previous studies of partially-dollarized economy inflation targeting by
incorporating the effect of a currency-matching rule. Specifically, such a rule implies imposing a
restriction to credit dollarization in order to guarantee that any form of foreign-currency-
denominated debt (or bank credit) ls solely allocated to the export business sector of the eco
nomy. The results are straightforward. When the economy is not financially exposed to reai ex-
change rate risk: (j) the volatility of the major macroeconomic variables is reduced, reflecting gains
in terms of welfare, and (ji) the optimal policy reaction function becomes less responsive to chan-
ges in the risk premium and the foreign interest rate, and more reactive to movements in the
output gap and expected inflation. The consequences from (i) and (ii) suggest that the advice that
calls for liability de-dollarization in small open economies, should solely apply to the non-export
business sector.
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Economic turbutence and incoherence are associated with both deep depressions and severe inffalions: they lead to
serious systemic deviations of output from potential oulpul. Whereas the orthodox Iheory finds Ihat decentralized
market processes lead to optimums, the financial instability hypothesis holds thal the outcomes of capilafisl market
processes are often seriously ffawed. However, the full effect of Ihese ffaws, such as deep and long depressions,
can be conlained by apt economic ooticies". H. Minsky (1994, o.a)
1. INTRODUCTlON
Most emerging market economies which still issue a local currency exhibit
high levels of partial oollarization'. This phenomenon, which in most cases was
• Thanks to Lei Zhang, Eduardo Morón, Diego Winkelried, Lucio Sarno, Marcus Miller,
Martin Ellison, Rodrigo Dupleich, Christopher Kubelec, Kiran Kowshik.
* email: a.g.garcia@warwick.ac.uk
1 Partial or Financial Dollarization refers to a dollarization process related to asset substitu-
tion and not currency substitution. Therefore, as Broda and Levy (2001) indicate, it is
associated to the savings component of broad money.
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originated during the hyperinflationary experiences of past decades, still persists
today. In this sense, the most relevant literature has associated such a persis-
tence (the so-called hysteresfs-) to: (i) the existence of an "original sin'", and (ii)
the permanence of high volatility in both inflation and local interest rates.
Agents belonging to open emerging market economies usually dollarize a
proportion of their financial assets through either continuous capital outflows
(which will be referred to hereafter as off-shore dollarization) or also (when le-
gally permitted) through domestic deposit and credit dollarization (which will be
referred to hereafter as partíal domestíc dollarízatíon). In any case, the dollariza-
tion of a proportion of the domestic economy's assets either internally or off-
shore is a reality which reflects the inability of most local currencies to act as a
store of value.
In the case of domestic dollarization, and specifically, when credit dollariza-
tion or other form of foreign-currency-denominated debt is available for domestic
corporate firms, a delicate issue arises concerning the implementation of mone-
tary policy. As highlighted by Krugman (1999 and 2000) and Aghion, Bachetta
and Banerjee (2000), when domestic firms holc a large proportion of their liabili-
ties in foreign currency, the practice of monetary policy becomes very problematic.
The reason is that while a reduction in local interest rates might generate an
expansionary effect through the so-called "credit channel", the resulting reai ex-
change rate depreciation from such an interest rate cut, might have a perverse
(contractive) consequence attributed to a firms' "balance sheet effect".
In this sense, the monetary authority in a partially-dollarized economy faces a
complexity when taking policy decisions in response to shocks-. That is, depend-
ing on the size of the shock, the need to cut down interest rates in order to stabi-
lize output is mitigated by the adverse effect that such an interest rate cut might
2 See Honohan and Shi (2002) for an explanation to the existence of hysteresis or a
"ratchet effect".
3 In the terms of Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), most currencies from emerging-
market economies have an "original sin". This implies that they cannot be used either to
borrow abroad or to borrow long-term even in the local market.
4 See, for instance, Aghion, Bachetta and Banerjee (2000) who discuss the optimal mene-
tary response to a productivity shock. See also, Calvo and Reinhart (2000) who discuss
the different responses to foreign demand shocks under "fear of floating".
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have upon the real exchange rate and therefore upon firms' balance sheets. Cal-
vo and Reinhart (2000) have labelled this phenomenon the "Fear of Floating".
The partial dollarization condition is therefore crucial to the analysis. This is
due to the fact that under the absence of partial dollarization or when dollariza-
tion is full, there cannot be abalance sheet effects, This is because when both
the asset side and the liability side of a firm's balance sheet are denominated in
the same currency, there is no exposure to currency mismatches, and therefore
to exchange rate risk.
The above mentioned fact is the reason for the great debate among those
who propose full dollarization and those -who propose complete de-dollarization.
On the one hand, those who propose full dollarization tend to stress the benefits
of dollarization in terms of: lower inflation, greater credibility, lower interest rates,
lower transaction costs in trade and investment, and the full elimination of ex-
change rate risk. On the other hand, those who oppose full dollarization, and
instead propose complete de-dollarization underline: the loss of an independent
monetary policy under full dollarization, the loss of seigniorage and inflation tax,
the more costly adjustment to asymmetric shocks, and the lack of a lender of
last resort".
Recently, however, an intermediate (or middle) position in the debate has
arisen with the intention to preserve most of the benefits from both proposals.
Specifically, such an intermediate position recognizes the need to retain an inde-
pendent monetary policy', and as well, the need to develop a financial market in
local currency. However, the same position also acknowledges the importance of
retaining the benefits of partial dollarization in terms of greater financial deepen-
jng and access to international credit. In the end, it is c1ear that any inconven-
ience related to partial dollarization might arise only from the liability side (due to
5 However, Chang and Velasco (2000) and Roubini (2001) warn that under full dollariza-
tion it is still possible to observe balance sheet eftects. I will return to this specific point
later on.
6 This will be discussed further.
7 AÍl independent monetary policy (e.g. inflation targeting) is feasible given the fact that
partial dollarization does not imply the presence of currency substitution for real markets
transactions such as the purchase of commodities, payments of wages, etc., and therefo-
re, the monetary authority is still able to conduct an .efficient monetary policy in order to
stabilize the inflation rate and the output gap.
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currency-mismatches), while the benefits might come from both the liability side
and the asset side"
This paper examines and propases the introduction of a "currency-matching
rule'". In practice, such a rule implies imposing a restriction to credit dollarization
in arder to guarantee that any form of foreign-currency-denominated debt (mainly
bank loans and corporate bonds) is solely allocated to the export business sector
of the economy. This should eliminate the firms' balance sheet effect and there-
fare reduce the fear ot floating. This is evident from the fact that the balance
sheet of export business firms does not usually present currency mismatches.
since both, their assets and liabilities are mainly denominated in the same (for-
eign) currency. When currency mismatches are completely eliminated from the
economy", the exchange rate risk disappears and real exchange rate deprecia-
tions become unambiguously expansionary: Therefore, the practice of monetary
policy can be facilitated, while the benefits of partial dollarization are retained.
This paper studies the implications of the introduction of the proposed cur-
rency-matching rule for monetary policy and welfare. Specifically, the paper
compares the resulting optimal monetary policy response and the volatility of the
majar macroeconomic variables under the presence of the currency-matching
rule, to the case in which the rule is absent.
The model in this paper is a small open-economy macroeconomic model. It
was previously merged by Morón and Winkelried (2002), who combined an en-
dogenous risk premium from Cespedes and others (2000) with Svensson's
(2000) original model.
8The benefits from the asset side are mainly related to the fact that domestic deposit dolla-
rízation provides a protection against the devaluation risk of the local currency, and there-
fore an alternative to capital out-flights (off-shore dollarization). which in turn, allows for
the deepening of domestic financial markets and the extension of bank loans maturities.
The benefits from the Iiability side are that partial dollarization increases the economy's
access to international credit markets, mainly through the global banking system and their
ability to create virtual electronic money.
9 See Goldstein (2002) for an alternative prcposal based on hedging instruments and
other mechanisms.
10 This statement assumes that no major currency-mismatch is present either at the public
sector level or at the household level.
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As in Svensson (2000), the conventional transmission channels for monetary
policy are the aggregate-demand channeland the expectations channel. In the
first case, given nominal rigidities, the central bank can affect short-term real
interest rates. This, in turn affects the aggregate demand (with a lag), and finally
inflation (with an additional lag). Through the expectations channel, monetary
policy affects expectations about future inflation, which through the practice of
price and wage setting finally affects actual inflation (with a lag).
The role of the real exchange rate in the model is crucial. Given the fact that
most small-open economies present a high share of imported final goods, varia-
tions in the exchange rate have a great impact upon ePI inflation through the so-
called direct exchange rate channel.
Additionally, as the real exchange rate affects the relative price between do-
mestic goods and foreign goods, and it, therefore affects both the domestic and
foreign demand for domestically produced goods, it also has an impact upon the
aggregate-demand channel in the transmission of monetary policy. Finally, as in
the case of final imported goods, exchange rate movements which have an im-
pact upon the domestic price of imported inputs, affect the cost of domestically
produced goods.
An additional importance of the exchange rate is that, as an asset price, it re-
sponds to a forward-Iooking behaviour, which makes expectations about this
variable a fundamental mechanism for the economy. Moreover, the exchange
rate reacts immediately in response to certain external shocks such as to foreign
inflation and international interest rates.
The incomplete pass-through from the exchange rate to domestic prices is
fundamental". This occurs because unanticipated real exchange rate deprecia-
tions affect the endogenous risk premium through two different channels. Firstly,
a real exchange rate depreciation increases the competitiveness of domesti-
cally produced products. This in turn, reduces the risk premium. On the con-
trary however; an unanticipated real exchange rate depreciation deteriorates
the balance sheet of non-export business firms. This instead, increases inves-
tors' risk premium.
11 If the pass-through from the exchange rate to domestic prices is complete, there would
not be a balance sheet effect. This is due to the fact that any exchange rate depreciation
would be immediately transferred to domestic prices offsetting the effect of any increase in
the domestic-currency value of firms' liabilities.
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Therefore, these two antagonistic channels mean that the result from a real
exchange rate depreciation is ambiguous for the economy. Only in the case
when the balance sheet effect is not present, the effect of a real exchange rate
depreciation becomes diaphanously expansionary. It is in this sense, that this
paper examines the implications of a currency-matching rule for monetary policy
and welfare.
The paper is summarized as follows. Section 1.1 briefly discusses the litera-
ture review on closed-economy inflation targeting. Section 1.2 covers the appeal-
ing debate on full and partial dollarization, currency regimes, and exchange rate
risk. Section 1.3 deals with the extension of inflation targeting schemes to the
partially-dollarized economy. Section 2.1 introduces and discusses the theoreti-
cal model. Section 2.2 presents the endogenously-determined risk premium.
Section 2.3 introduces the loss function. Section 3.1 presents the parameters of
the model. Section 3.2 presents the results, and Section 4 concludes and con-
siders areas for further research.
1.1 On Closed-Economy Inflation Targetitlg
After a long period of predominance of monetarism and exclusive attention to
the study of the implications of real factors for the business cycle, a new torrent
of literature and empirical work has successfully initiated research on the effect of
monetary determinants upon the real economy. Moreover, the recent literature
which has been mainly originated in the late 1980's, presentsevidence in favour
of the short-run non-neutrality condition of money.
A critical issue which has determined the devíatíon from the orthodox busi-
ness cycle theory is the explicit introduction of nominal rigidities in the formation
of prices (see, for instance, Calvo (1983) for a simplified staggered price-setting
behaviour). Therefore, the study of the realistic conditions under which prices
and wages are set, becomes fundamental. Under sticky prices, monetary policy
can affect the course of the real economy in the short-run. However, in the long-
run when prices are completely flexible (adjustable) the effect of monetary policy
is observed in the nominal variables, such as wages and prices.
It is this debate regarding price and wage-setting behaviour, and the pro-
gress gained in the study of dynamíc general equílíbrium models which lead to a
surge in the attention to topics on monetary policy.
Among the major recent working papers on c1osed-economy monetary pol-
icy, John Taylor's proposal of a simple interest rate rule in Taylor (1993), and the
support from Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) for inflation targeting represent well-
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known examples. Additionally, the paper from Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999)
constitutes a remarkable summary of the relevant literature on positive and nor-
mative aspects related to the practice and art of monetary policy.
Specifically, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) present a c1osed-economy
macroeconomic model,in which a short-term interest rate becomes the instru-
ment of monetary policy". The policy reaction function of the central bank is de-
rived from the minimization of a quadratic (welfare) loss function. The monetary
policy problem in such a model is to describe the way the instrument adjusts to
the conditions of the economy. In this sense, the presence of nominal rigidities
becomes fundamental given the influence that monetary policy has upon the
short-term real interest rateo Therefore, as in Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1980),
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) also present a Phillips curve which is derived
from staggered nominal price setting.
Additionally, in their model (and precisely in the aggregate demand equa-
tion), current output gap depends not only on the real interest rate but also on
expected future output. Given consumers' preferences for smoothing consump-
tion, an increase in expected future consumption (associated to higher expected
permanent income) causes an increase in current consumption. This in turn,
precipitates an increase in current demanded output. Furthermore, in the aggre-
gate demand, the negative impact of movements in the short-term real interest
rate, captures the effect of the intertemporal substitution of consumption. Equiva-
lently, the disturbance in the same equation reflects expected changes in the
government's expenditure plans.
In the case of the supply (Phillips) curve, inflation depends completely on
current and expected future conditions. Therefore, no inflationary inertia is pre-
sent. Changes in marginal costs are fundamentally related to changes in excess
demando However, a "cost-push" shock is added to capture any other variation in
marginal costs not associated with excess demando
A relevant complexity is therefore introduced when private sector's behav-
iour, depends not only on the current evolution, but as well on the expected fu-
ture path of monetary policy. Particularly, in their model, the output gap depends
on the current and future course of the interest rate, and therefore, inflation de-
penes on the current and expected future path of the output gap. As initially stated
12 As Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) indicate, the selection of a short-term interest rate,
as the instrument of monetary policy, responds to the fact that the experience of using
bread moneyaggregates, suggests that those indirect indicators are too instable.
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by Kydland and Prescott (1977); under the above mentioned conditions, credibility
of future policy objectives represents a fundamental aspect in the analysis.
In this situation, agent's beliefs about the future level of the interest rate, be-
comes relevant since both households and firms show a forward looking behav-
iour. For example, when a central bank is credible, a commitment to a low-
inflation policy in the future, may allow the central bank to reduce current inflation
with a lower cost in terms of output contraction than might otherwise be neces-
sary in the absence of commitment. This occurs because such a commitment
allows the central bank to credibly influence private sector's beliefs about the
future course of monetary policy and therefore of the state of the economy.
However, under discretion, which represents the case when the central bank
is not trusted and therefore, cannot credibly cornrnit itself to a fix monetary policy
rule, the implications are fundamentally different. Specifically, under the absence
of .commitment and therefore of a fix monetary policy rule, the optimal policy in-
volves inflation targeting. This occurs since under the absence of commitment,
the resulting adjustment to the optimal inflation rate is gradual. Such a gradual
adjustment is due to the worse short-run outputlinflation trade-off observed under
the case of discretion. The implications for the optimal monetary policy rule, is
that the central bank should modify the nominal rate more than one-for-one, in
relation to changes in expected future inflation. That is, when expected inflation
increases, the central bank should increase nominal rates sufficiently to generate
an increase in the real interest rate.
An additional implication of the case under discretion is that the central bank
is able to choose the interest rate by reoptimizing every periodo This occurs since
under the absence of commitment, central bank's previous measures and an-
nouncements do not constrain current or future policy. In contrast, under a com-
mitment to a specific monetary policy rule, the central bank chooses and (abides
by) an unvarying strategy describing the future path for interest rates. Even
though interest rates might respond in reaction to changes in the state of the
economy, both the sign and intensity of the reaction do not vary over time.
Another major difference between the case of commitment and the case of
discretion is that, in the former case, the central bank's binding promise is what
makes the policy credible in equilibrium. In contrast, in the case of discretion,
given the fact that the central bank is free to reoptimize every period, agents form
their expectations by taking into consideration the way the central bank modifies
its policy. An interesting issue which arises from this case is that the resulting
long-run rational expectations equilibrium guarantees that the central bank has
no incentive to change its strategy in an unexpected way, even though it has the
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option to do so. The literature has labelled this particular characteristic of the
equilibrium under discretion as "Dynamic (or Time) Consistent Equilibrium".
The consequence of the rational expectations equilibrium under discretion is
that the central bank takes private sector's expectations as given, which is the
equivalent of ·saying that agents are able to anticípate central bank's movements
and therefore cannot be (continuously) fooled.
The findings from Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) also show that as long as
a "cost push" inflation disturbance exists, there is a short-run trade-off between
inflation and output volatility". As mentioned before, they also illustrate that under
discretion, the resulting optimal policy (inflation targeting) requires a gradual con-
vergence of infiation to its target. This involves a sufficíently active response to
changes in expected inflation, in order to affect real interest rates to push inflation
back to its path. However, when a "cost push" inflation disturbance is not present
or when the monetary authority is extremely "conservative" and therefore has no
concern for output volatility, then the optimal policy is "extreme" inflation targeting
implying not a gradual but immediate convergence of infiation to its target.
Another major result is that while the monetary policy should offset demand
shocks, it should only accommodate productivity shocks by maintaining interest
rafes constant. The rationale is simple, by offsetting demand shocks, output and
infiation return to their correct path. However, in the case of a positive productiv-
ity shock, an increase in prbductivity generates an increment in permanent in-
come, which in turn, affects consumption in a way that both, potential and
demanded output increase, while leaving the output gap and inflation rate intact.
Regarding the issue of credibility and the benefits from commitment, the ini-
tial work of Kydland and Prescott (1977), and the subsequent works from Barro
and Gordon (1983), and Rogoff (1985) represent the most prominent research.
Regarding the discussion on credibility, two major issues are emphasized. Firstly,
when a central bank has a concern for output volatility, and specífically, when it
has the desire to increase output aboye its natural level, then it is said that a
persistent inflationary bias is present in the monetary policy. Secondly, when a
central bank is not publicly perceived as committed to fighting inflation, then the
cost of disinflating may be more severe than might otherwise be. In both cases,
the link to the credibility problem is that as long as wage and price-setting beha-
13 See Woodford (1998) for a case in which the inflation/output trade-off arises due to the
addition of an interest rate (smoothing) target into the conventional central bank's loss
functíon.
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viour is forward-Iooking, inflation depends on the expected future course of the
monetary policy.
In this sense, both issues share a common consequence. That is, if a central
bank is able to enhance its credibility by establishing a commitment, then it will
be able to reduce inflation at a lower cost in terms of output contraction. This
occurs because under commitment, the central bank exploits the ability to ma-
nipulate (guide) private sector's expectations of the future.
The findings from Clarida, Galí, andGertler (1999) also reveal that when the
central bank desires to push output above its natural level, the resulting equilib-
rium is suboptimal, given that fhe economy shows an inflation rate above its tar-
get without any gain in terms of output. This result arises because the private
sector incorporates central bank's true aspirations, in order to perfectly forecast
future inflation. As originally indicated by Rogoff (1985), they also find that desig-
nating a "conservative" central banker with a greater distaste for inflation than the
rest of the society, reduces the effect of the inefficient inflationary bias, observed
under discretion. However, they also argue that this is not a magic solution, be-
cause designating an ultraconservative central banker might also reduce overall
welfare, given the (previously mentioned) inflation/output trade-off.
Probably, one of the major illuminating ideas from Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1999) is their explanation regarding thegains from enhancing credibility. Indeed,
they show that even under the absence of an inflationary bias, as long as price-
setting behaviour depends on expectations of the future state of the economy,
then the gains from commitment arise because the short-run trade-off between
inflation and output is improved. They also demonstrate that in such a case, the
optimal result from commitment is similar to the solution under discretion, when
the central bank assigns a greater cost to inflation than the society as a whole.
Another difference between the case of commitment and the case of discre-
tion is the resulting response function of the interest rate. The response in the
case of constrained cornrnitrnent" is even more reactive to changes in expected
inflatjon. That is, under commitment, inflation converges more rapidly to its tar-
gel. The reason is that given the improved output/inflation trace-off, the central
bank can afford to increase interest rates by a larger amount, in response to an
incrementin expected inflation .
.Hln terms of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), the constrained commitment represents the
case in which the choice of the (optimal) level of output gap is restricted to depend on the
contemporaneous value of the cost push shock.
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A rather different case is the one under unconstrained commitment. It repre-
sents the case in which the optimal choice of the level of output gap is not re-
stricted to depend on the contemporaneous value of the cost push shock, but
instead it is allowed to depend on its entire history. The difference is that, in prin-
cipie, in the case of unconstrained commitment, the reaction function requires an
adjustment in.the change of the output gap as opposed to its leve/.
In this sense, it is relevant to say that under unconstrained commitment to a
fix monetary policy rule, the intertemporal optimization problem requires, initially
choosing (only in the first period) the optimallevel of the output gap, in response
to changes in inflation, exactly in the same way as it is done under discretion.
However, as previously said, for subsequent periods, the policy reaction function
will depend on the change of the output gap instead of its level.
The implication from aboye is, that while the optimal response under discre-
tion, is to reduce output gap in reaction to an increase in inflation, and then, allow
the output gap in subsequent periods to return back to its trend as inflation falls;
the optimal reaction under unconstrained commitment is to keep reducing the
output gap (in subsequent periods) as long as inflation persists aboye its target.
As mentioned before, this is due to the ability the central bank has of manipulat-
ing agents' expectations, and by doing so, of benefiting from an improved out-
putlinflation trade-off. This in turn, (relative to the case of discretion) accelerates
the process of convergence of inflation to its target.
Probably, the most evident conclusion from the case of commitment is that
when the monetary authority sticks to a fix policy rule, the resulting monetary
policy is not "time consistent". This is because if the monetary authority were free
to reoptimize in every subsequent period, evidently, it would opt for the same
policy it carried out initially; the one which replicates the rule under discretion for
the first period only.
In addition, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) show that the result from uncon-
strained commitment requires the central bank to partially adjust aggregate de-
mand, in response to anincrease in inflation. Such a .esult reflects the benefits
from the strong dependence of current inflation on expected future demando Addi-
tionally, they show that such a result is superior to any other result under discre-
tion, even when the appointment of a "conservative" central banker is considered.
Additionally, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) also study the case of imper-
fect information and parameter uncertainty. The resulting conclusions from the
case of imperfect information and parameter uncertainty imply that the optimal
policy rules represent the certainty equivalent versions of the case under perfect
information, which in practice, requires the use of forecasts for the target variables
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instead of their ex-post observed values. They also c1aim that, relative to what the
economic theory suggests, the smoother path of the interest rates, observed in
practice, might well be explained by the presence of parameter uncertaínty.
In addition, they propose that in the case when small output gap deviations
involve a greater cost than small departures of inflation from its target, then the
optimal approach to disinflation should be "opportunistic''. In practice, it implies
that the central bank should follow an inflatíon targeting policy around a zone
instead of targeting inflation around a particular value.
Finally, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) demonstrate the robustness of their
results by analyzing the casewith endogenous output and inflation persistence.
The findings show that the results under discretion also apply under the presence
of endogenous output and inflation inertia. However, one of the major differences
is that in the case of endogenous output and inflation persistence, the resultíng
monetary policy affects not only the gap between inflatíon and its target, but also
the speed (or rate) of convergence of inflation to its target.
1.2 On Full And Partial Dollarization And Exchange Rafe Risk
Perhaps the most remarkable debate during the recent years has been the
díscussion concerning currency regime choices for emerging-market economies.
Calvo and Reinhart (2000 and 2001) and Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein (2000)
have put forward the argument in favour of full dollarization and against floating.
In contrast, Edwards (2001) has accused the defenders of full dollarization of
engaging in "misleading advertising".
On the other hand, Hanke (2002) and Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (1998) have
made the case for currency boards. Williamson (2000) has recommended a
"BBC"regíme combining a basket peg, a band, and a crawl. In addition, Larrain
and Velasco (2001) have emphasized the beneñts from managed ñoatinq against
"hard pegs". Finally, Crokett (1994), Eichengreen (1994), Summers (2000), and
Fischer (2001) have all defended the 'bipotar''" perspective of currency reqirnes".
15The "bipolar" point of view, regarding currency regime choices,asseverates that the only
sustainable currency regimes for emerging-market economies heavily affected by private
capital markets are eithera "float" or a "hard fix". A hard fix is usually associated to either
currency boards or agreements in which a country abandons its national currency. Regu-
larly, the abandonment of a national currency involves either becoming a member of a
currency union or adopting the currency of another country (which is referred to throug-
hout this paper as full dollarization).
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In terms of Goldstein (2002), there are three major findings regarding the
discontent with currency regimes. Firstly, "soft pegs" and simple "crawls" have
exhibited a very low resistance to crises. In deed, as expressed by Fischer
(2001) the majority of the financial crises during the 1990's, have been related to
either a fixed peg or crawling band exchange rate regirnes". Secondly and par-
ticularly brought to light during the recent crisis in Argentina, a "hard fix" (e.g. a
currency board) is neither free of speculative attacks, nor does give the irnpres-
sion to count on a practical policy instrument for overcoming recessions when
monetary policy is directed from abroad. This occurs since the inflexibility associ-
ated to those currency regimes, makes it impossible to counter liquidity crises,
external debt fragilities or even worse to avoid a real exchange rate overvaluation.
Finally, as previously shown by Calvo and Reinhart (2000) and Hausmann,
Panizza, and Stein (2000); Goldstein (2002) also indicates that independently of
the publicly declared currency regime, emerging-market economies have not
been able to float in the same way industrial countries have. Additionally, all
these authors indicate that in comparison to the industrialized economies, devel-
oping countries have been urged to rely more heavily on interest rate policy and
on exchange rate market interventions to control the variation of the nominal
exchange rate". Moreover, many other authors have also pointed out that
emerging-market economies have perceived less benefit from floating than what
industrialized countries have.
In this sen se, Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein (2000) and Calvo and Reinhart
(2001) present empirical evidence suggesting that real exchange rate deprecia-
tions in emerging-market economies have usually been contractionary and have
been accompanied by relatively substantial downgrades in credit ratinqst''. There-
rore, the authors state that the independence of monetary policy in emerging-
16 Evidently, there are also other general positions such as in Frankel (1999) and Kenen
(2001) who argue that "no single currency regime is right for all countries at all times".
17 For examples: Mexico in 1994; Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea in 1997; Brazil and
Russia in 1998; Argentina, and Turkey in 2000-2001.
18 In terms of a quadratic (welfare) loss function of the central bank; this is the equivalent of
saying, that some central banks from developing countries have been urged to make the
exchange rate an additional objective of monetary policy.
19 The downgrade in credit ratings is fundamental for the analysis of the eftecl of a real
exchange rate depreciation. In lhe model this is captured by an increase in the endoge-
.nously-determined risk premium.
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market economies is not evidently any greater in floating rate countries than in
fixed rate ones. They also indicate that depreciations in emerging-market eco-
nomies have been coupled with a greater exchange rate pass-through than in the
case of industrialized countries. Additionally, they find that exchange rate variabi-
Iity' has a larger negative effect on foreign trade in developing countries, and also
that fioaters have registered less significant increases in the depth of their finan-
cial markets.
Goldstein (2002) wisely indicates that under the aboye mentioned conditions,
emerging-market economies seem to be facing a "no-win situation in their choice
of currency reqirnes". He argues that if they decide in favour of soft pegs, the
result is a very high probability of a painful currency collapse. Instead, if they opt
for either a hard peg or a conventional managed floating regime, even though
they might enjoy a lower vulnerability to currency crises, the "fear of floating"
combined with a high exposure to private capital market movements, or simply
an inconvenient debt profile, may well be sufficient to cause unsatisfactory eco-
nomic performance.
It is for this reason that the recent controversial discussion regarding cur-
rency regime choices for developing countries has been concentrated on the
bipolar (corner) solution. As mentioned befare, such a corner solution involves
two alternatives (see footnote 14). Firstly, on one extreme, it could imply the in-
corporation of a "hard fix" which (in arder of preference) would mean, (i) either
joining a currency union, (ii) establishing full dollarization or (iii) adopting a cur-
rency board. On the other extreme, the establishment of a sophisticated man-
aged float with certain specific characteristics (under partial dollarization)
represents the final outstanding corner solution.
On the one hand, joining a currency union is certainly the first best in any
casev. However in practice, such a solution might not always be feasible, given
the fact that it requires either the coincidence of political interests in the institution
of a regional central bank, or simply the accomplishment of the membership it-
setf?'. On the other hand, the recent failure of the currency board in Argentina
20 The major reason is that as opposed to the cases of fu 11 dollarization or currency boards,
under a currency union, tne countries which abandon their national currencies do not
necessarily lack an independent monetary policy. This occurs because even though the
monetary policy is centralized and harmonized from abroad, such a monetary policy res-
ponds to the common interests of all members.
2'1ñdeed, many steps must be taken before forming a currency union. The most basic one
is reaching sufficiently high levels of intraregional trade.
Partial dol/arization:. 215
has made such a solution a prohibitive one. For those reasons, the bipolar alter-
natives leave us with two final options: (i) either adopting full dollarization or (ii)
establishing a very specific managed floatinq regime under partial dollarization.
In this paper, this last alternative is presented as the optimal second best solu-
tion, or in other words, as the first best available solution".
Reqardmq the case of full dollarization, the developing country has to be will-
ing to give up its own national currency (and therefore its monetary policy) in
order to adopt the currency (and morietary policy) from another country. On the
one hand, such a solution represents a gain in terms of international trade. This
is because even though the evidence shows no reliable connection between
short-run exchange rate volatility and the volume of trade for the case of indus-
trial countriest-, in the case of emerging-market economies, the variability of rela-
tive prices seems to be fundamental in the explanation of movements in the
volume of international trade>.
Another evident benefit from full dollarization is that due to the absence of an
exchange rate, currency mismatches are completely eliminated from the econ-
omy. Equivalently, the absence of a local currency (to attack) eliminates the pos-
sibility of a currency crisis. However, as Chang and Velasco (2000) and Roubini
(2001) argue, the absence of currency mismatches does not necessarily imply
that a balance sheet effect would not take place (see footnote 5). This is because
under full dollarization, it is still possible to gradually affect nominal domestic
prices. Indeed, if a change in relative prices ís required, a gradual fall in the no-
minal prices (rather than a swift nominal exchange rate reaction under a float)
increases the real value of the debt service relative to the price of non-tradable
goods. This in turn, deteriorates corporate and bank balance sheets. In the view
22 The reader must bear in mind that the first best solution has said to be the joining of a
currency union. However, the reader should also keep in mind that such a solution might
not always be feasible. That ís why a second best solution or a first best available solution
is considered.
23 See Goldstein (1995) and Frankel (1999) for suitable explanati6ns to this matter. In the
case of Goldstein (1995), the author infers that in the case of industrial countries, the
absence of a significant connection between exchange rate variability and international
trade might be related to the development of hedging instruments and the growth of rnulti-
national corporations.
2' See also McCallum (1995), Engel and Rogers (1996) and Rose (2000) for studies which
argue that the presence of a common currency seems to have a larger impact upon the
volume of trade than the degree of exchange rate volatility per se.
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of Chang and Velasco (2000) and Roubini (2001) the adjustment could take lon-
ger under full dollarization, but it will definitely occur.
Another argument in favour of full dollarization is that it might diminish the
risk of banking crises. The argument is as follows: in the absence of expectations
of future devaluation, there will not be sudden bank runs (or at least those) initi-
ated by the need to convert local-currency denominated deposits into foreign
currency. However, as Rojas-Suarez (2000) argues, fu 11 dollarization would
probably make it more difficult to overcome a banking crisis given the fact that
the possibility of reducing the real value of bank liabilities by inflating or
depreciating the currency would not exist.
In summary, the most valid arguments in favour of full dollarization seem to
be those related to the gains in terms of lower inflation, greater credibility, lower
interest rates, lower transaction costs in trade and investment, and the full elimi-
nation of exchange rate risk.
Regarding the disadvantages of full dollarization, probably one of the most
evident shortcomings is the fact that under full dollarization, the economy lacks
an independent monetary policy. This in turn, imposes restrictions in terms of the
absorption of fiscal crises (when substantial fiscal deficits and debt burdens are
present), or simply in response to general asymrnetric shocks.
Fully dollarized economies also suffer from not having an instrument to deal
with domestic financial crises since the absence of a national monetary authority
makes it impossible to print money, either to act as a lender of last resort or for
any other purpose. An additional outstanding disadvantage from full-dollarization
is that the government from a fully dollarized economy loses the revenue from
seigniorage, that is, the proceeds the central bank enjoys from issuing non-
interest-bearing debt in the form of money base.
Regarding the second best solution, oro first best available solution, the estab-
lishment of a specific managed floating regime 25 under partial dollarization seems
to be the most favourable present alternative. The reason why it has to consider
and include the presence of partial dollarization is because, as mentioned in the
Introduction, most emerging market econornies which still issue a domestic cur-
rency, exhibit high levels of partial dollarization.
25 In arder to agree with the label assigned by Goldstein (2002) such a regime could be
referred to as "Managed Floating Plus".
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As mentioned before, most currencies from emerging-market economies
have an "original sin". In terms of Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), this im-
plies that " ... the domestic currency cannot be used to borrow abroad or to borrow
long terrn, even domestically". In practice, this means that there are only a few
currencies worldwide which can play the role of being universal stores of value26.
Table 1. Percentage of External Debt
Denominated In Local Currency a::::s:....::.of:...:D=ec::::e::,m.:..:.b:::.:e:.:r_1:..::9:.:9:.:9 _
LoansfromlnternationalBanks InternationalDebtSecurities
Country
Argentina
Chile
China
Colombia
CzechRepublic
HongKong
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Israel
Mexico
Peru
Poland
Russia
SaudiArabia
SouthAfrica
SouthKorea
Thailand
Venezuela
Banks
5
8
3
23
3
4
9
9
2
14
27
4
30
2
3
8
OtheBorrowers
9
5
18
2
7
3
3
11
8
7
Corporate
Issuers
3
14
2
12
37
Financial
institutions
18
73
28
Public
Sector
2
25
Cont.
26At the time of writing this paper, the currenciesconsidered universal stores of value are:
the U.S. dollar, the euro, the yen, and the pound.
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Memorandum
Germany" 61
Japan 61
USA 10
UK 81
Source: Hawkins and Turner (2000).
62
29
26
85
64
44
44
78
56
28
36
83
99
16
13
95
Table 1, which is available from Hawkins and Turner (2000)28, shows that
emerging market economies have much smaller percentages of external debt
denominated in their own local currency. Moreover, in the specific case of inter-
national debt securities, apart from a few evident cases like Hong Kong, and
South Africa, the percentage of external debt issued by corporate firms, the pu-
blic sector or through financial institutions is either zero or very low. It also shows
that local currency-denominated external debt is more extensive in the case of
international bank loans than in any other case. However, for most of the coun-
tries, apart from the case of Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, and South Africa,
such percentages do not exceed a single digit.
In this sense, Table 1 presents evidence of the so-called "original sin"29. Mo-
reover, in the absence of hedging instruments, which seems to be the case in
most emerging market economies, and following Eichengreen and Hausmann
(1999), it is inferred that as long as an "original sin" remains present, investments
in emerging market economies are inexorably accompanied by either currency
mismatches or maturity mismatches.
Thus, regarding again the first best available solution in terms of currency re-
gimes, the establishment of a specific managed floating regime under partial
dollarization should address the problem of currency mismatches. This can be
done in terms of Goldstein (2002) by developing hedging instruments in the
emerging market economies. However, it is the view of this paper that as develo-
ping a market for hedging instruments in the emerging market economies might
take some time; imposinq a currency-matching rule to the private sector in order
27 As of December 1999, the German mark was still considered a universal store of value
at least for the case of the European Union.
28For some developing countries, the results might have been overestimated because it is
assumed that all loans which have not been denominated in a major foreign currency are
denominated in the country's local currency.
29 See Knight, Schembri, and Powell (2000), Kenen (2001), and Goldstein (2002) for posi-
tionswhich ratherconclude that the "original sin"hypothesis can be excessively pessimistic.
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to reduce the "fear of floating" can facilitate the introduction of a currency regime,
able to retain the benefits from both a partial dollarization under floating, and an
independent monetary policy.
Finally, regarding the monetary policy frarnework, even though it has to be
acknowledged that emerging market economies confront greater obstacles in the
implementation of infiation targeting than industrialized countries, such a frame-
work seems to have interested most developing countries. Thus, for example
Truman (2001) includes in his group of "potential" candidates for inflation targe-
ting: Argentina, China, Ecuador, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malay-
sia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Taiwan, Turkey, and
Venezuela. In this sense, the following section deals directly with the discussion
regarding the extension of infiation targeting schemes to the partially-dollarized
open economy.
1.3 On Partíally-Dollarízed Economy Inflation Targeting
Certainly, Svensson's (2000) work represents one of the major contributions
to the study of open economy inflation targeting. He describes the monetary re-
gime under inflation targeting as a framework which usually counts on: (i) a c1ear-
Iy defined quantitative inflation target, (ii) an "inflation-forecast-targeting"
procedure, and (iii) a high degree of transparency and accountability.
Regarding the inflation target, it usually implies either a range or a specific
point target. In the case of a range target, regularly it fluctuates (across coun-
tries) from 1.5 to 3.0 percent (per year). In relation to the inflation-forecast-
targeting procedure, it is characterized by an inflation forecast estimate which
depends upon current available information, a specific interest rate path, the
central banks' structural model and further discretional adjustments derived from
extra-model information.
It is the lags in the transmission of monetary policy, the central bank's in-
complete control of inflation and the need to incorporate a forward-Iooking di-
mension, which makes it necessary to use of an inflation-forecast-targeting
procedure. However, the resulting inflation forecast estimate is used only as an
intermediate target variable. Additionally, the interest rate path is designed to be
consistent with a predetermined target assigned to the inflation forecast (the so-
called intermediate target).
Such an interrnedlate target can be explicit or impliclt: however, in any case,
at some particular horizon, it has to coincide with the (announced) quantitative
inflation target. Therefore, the designed interest rate path determines the rule for
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current interest rate setting. Nevertheless, such interest rate rule is not a prescri-
bed (or predetermined) one, but instead, it results from an endogenously deter-
mined response function, which makes the interest rate depend on all the
relevant information. Indeed, in the case of the open economy, the interest rate
also depends on external variables such as international interest rates, foreign
output and foreign inflation.
Regarding transparency and accountability, Svensson (2000) indicates that
under an inf!ation targeting framework, central banks frequently issue "Inflation
Reports", which are mainly meant to stimulate, notify and explain to the general
public the adopted decisions regarding the course of the monetary policy. In most
cases, such reports explain (if hecessary) the reasons for the presence of devia-
tions from the originally announced targets, as well as the appropriate future
measures to be taken in order to correct such deviations.
As previously outiined in Svensson (1998), Svensson (2000) also suggests
that inflation targeting can be seen as the "explicit announcement and assign-
ment of a relatively specific loss function to be minimized by the central bank".
Additionally, he conjectures that the inflation targeting procedure can be seen as
a mechanism which guarantees that the first order conditions from the minimiza-
tion of the (welfare) loss function are approximately accomplished.
Finally, Svensson (2000) also considers the transparency and accountability
observed under an inflation targeting framework as a means to let the general
public validate the achievement of such first order conditions. Moreover, Faust
and Svensson (1997) claim that a greater transparency makes the reputation of
the central banks more vulnerable, and therefore increases the cost from modif-
ying the originally announced policy. In that sense, Svensson (2000) believes
that ínflatíon targetíng relatíve to any other polícy reqirne, embodies the strongest
commitment to an optimizing policy, and therefore it can be perfectly represented
as a minimization process of a specific (welfare) loss function.
Svensson (1998 and 2000) introduces a small-open economy macroecono-
míe rnodel with a forward-Iooking behaviour. Specifically, the model includes
realistic lags and imperfect control of inflation. As in the closed economy, the
conventional transmission channels for monetary policy are the aggregate-
demand channel and the expectations channel. However, in the open economy,
the exchange rate introduces additional channels, the dynamics of which involve
diverse lags.
In the case of the conventional channels, and particularly, in the case of the
aggregate demand channel, given nominal rigidities, the central bank can affect
short-term real interest rates. This, in turn affects the aggregate demand (with a
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lag), and finally inflation (with an addítional lag). Through the expectations chan-
nel, monetary policy affects expectations about future inflation, which through the
practice of price and wage setting finally affects actual inflation (with a lag).
The connotation of the real exchange rate in the model is vital. Given the fact
that most srnall-open economies present a high share of imported final goods,
exchange rate variations have a great impact upon CPI inflation through the so-
called immediate direct exchange rate channel.
Additionally, as the real exchange rate affects the relative príce between do-
mestic goods and foreign goods, and consequently, as that has an effect on both
the domestic and foreign demand for domestically produced goods, the exchan-
ge rate contributes to the aggregate-demand channel in the transmission of rno-
netary policy. Finally, as in the case of final imported goods, exchange rate
variations which have an impact upon the domestic price of imported inputs, af-
fect the cost of domestically produced goods.
An additional importance of the exchange rate is that, as an asset price, it
responds to a forward-Iooking behaviour, which makes expectations about this
variable a fundamental mechanism for the economy. Moreover, given the flexibi-
litY of the exchange rate, it reacts immediately in response to certain external
shocks, such as shocks to foreign inftation and international interest rates.
As previously defined in Svensson (1998), Svensson (2000) also differentia-
tes between "strict inflation targeting" and "flexible inflation targeting" 30 In the first
case, the central bank's welfare loss function incorporates inflation stabilization
as the unique objective of monetary policy. In the case of flexible inflation targe-
ting, other objectives enter into the loss function. For instance,among others,
such objectives might include: a concern for output stabilization or simply for
interest rate smoothing. The implications are that, under strict inflation targeting
the monetary policy is more responsive and therefore, inflation converges more
rapidly to its target. On the contrary, under the case of flexible inflation targeting,
that is, when the central bank is also concerned with output stabilization or any
additional goal, the convergence of inflation to its target is more gradual.
Certainly, most inflation-targeting-countries have preferred targeting CPI in-
flation than just domestic inflation. The difference between CPI inflation and do-
mestic infiation is that domestic inflation only considers the inflation of
30 Recall that in terms ot Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) "strict inflation targeting" is equi-
valent to the case of "extreme inflation targeting". . .
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domestically produced goods, while CPI inflation includes in addition to regular
domestic inflation, the infiation (in domestic prices) of final imported goods. Thus,
under CPI inflation targeting, the direct exchange rate channel becomes
extremely relevant.
In this sense, when the central bank is only concerned with stabilizing infia-
tion, that is, when the central bank operates under strict CPI inflation targeting,
the direct exchange rate channel represents an effective instrument to achieve
inflation stabilization at a reasonably short horizon. As mentioned before, the
consequences of strict CPI inflation targeting is a more rapid convergence of
infiation to its target, anda greater frequency of adjustment of interest rates.
However, the cost of strict CPI infiation targeting is that it may cause a potentially
greater variability in other macroeconomic variables.
In the case of flexible CPI inflation targeting, that is when output or any other
variable represents an additional concern for the central bank, the resulting policy
usually implies a lower frequency of adjustments of the interest rate, and proba-
bly also a lower variability in other macroeconomic variables.
Svensson (2000) also considers the case of the so-called "Monetary Policy
índices" (MCls). MCls usually combine a short-term interest rate and the ex-
change rate inan index which attempts to capture the impact of monetary policy
on, both the aggregate demand and inflation. Svensson (2000) gives only limited
support for a specific MC!. In his model the resulting specific index (which only
has an impact upon aggregate demand) combines the expected real exchange
rate and the expected long real interest rate rather than the observable current
rates. Thus, he argues that "The monetary policy impact on inflation, which is
transmitted via several different channels with different lags, is too complex to be
summarized by any single index".
Regarding the problems related to the implementation of an inflation targe-
ting framework, in the case of the partially-dollarized economy, the major incon-
venience is (as previously argued) the existence of a "fear of floating". When a
."fear of floating" is present, there are incentives to make the exchange rate an
additional objective of the monetary policy". As previously mentioned, this is
related to both the probability of occurrence of balance sheet problems, and also
31 On the one hand, if the degree of pass-trough is very high, that is if a nominal deprecia-
tion causes swift proportional nominal price increases, then the fear of floating is related to
the repercussions upon inflation. In the opposite case, when the degree of pass-trough is
ver¡ low, the concern regarding a nominal depreciation is the deterioration of firms' balan-
ce sheets given the presence of foreign-currency-denominated liabilities.
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(implicit from previous comments) to the relative importance of the degree of
exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices, which in turn, affects inflation. In
the last case, given that the degree of exchange rate pass-through depends on
wage and price setting behaviour, this problem cannot be addressed easily, and
probably it might require the development of hedging instruments or additional
mechanisms. However, in the case of balance sheet problems, this paper ad-
dresses this difficulty by imposing the previously-called currency-matching rule.
As long as there are no balance sheet problems at the corporate and bank
firms' level, and assuming that both households and (mainly) the public sector
are covered against exchange rate risk, then the monetary policy would not face
contradictory objectives. The major relevance of the nominal exchange rate
would then be its impact upon domestic prices and nominal interest rates.
The next section introduces the model and the endogenous risk premium. In
the absence of the currency-matching rule, the risk premium behaviour reacts to
two ambiguous exchange rate effects: the competitiveness effect, and the balan-
ce sheet effect. When the currency-matching rule is present, the balance sheet
effect disappears and overall performance is considerably improved.
2.1 An Open-Economy Macroeconomic Model
The following model was previously merged by Morón and Winkelried (2002)
who combined an endogenous risk premium from Cespedes and others (2000)
with Svensson's (2000) original model32. As previously explained the model con-
siders lags in the transmission of monetary policy and imperfect control of infla-
tion. The role of the exchange rate in the model is crucial to both the transmission
of monetary policy and the determination of the investors' risk premium.
Specifically, the endogenous risk premium in Cespedes and others (2000)
captures the two ambiguous effects from a real exchange depreciation: the com-
petitiveness (or substitution) effect and the balance sheet effect. Finally, as pre-
viously explained, the forward-Iooking behaviour is fundamental in the
determination of the aggregate demand, inflation and the exchange rateo
The short-run aggregate supply (Phillips) curve takes the following form:
32 For those readers interested with the microfoundations, Svensson (1998) presents the
derivation of the aggregate supply (Phillips) curve and the aggregate demand equation,
and Cespedes and others (2000) present the derivation of the endogenous risk premium.
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(1)
In order to obtain a stationary systemall variables (except the interest rate)
have been expressed in logs as a measure of deviation from their long-run equi-
Iibrium (natural) leve!. Throughout this paper, the notation V, + r /, refers to the
rational expectations of "V, + r" using all the relevant information available at
time" t ". Moreover, TI, refers to domestic inflation at time" t " which is a varia-
ble predetermined two periods in advance. Equivalently, y, denotes the output
gap at time" t " which is a variable predetermined one period in advance (see
equation (2)). AII the aboye coefficients are positive constants. Particularly, in the
case of the inflationary inertia coefficient, this is less than one (0-< an -< 1). Fina-
lIy, e' + 2 denotes a "cost-push" shock assumed to be Ud. and of mean zero.
The aggregate demand equation (in terms of the output gap) is as follows:
33 (2)
Equivalently, as before, all coefficients are. positive (with O~ fJy -< 1), and
77'+1 is a zero mean Ud shock. The variables y: ' r, ' and <P, refer to foreign de-
mand, the short-term real interest rate, and the risk premium respectively, while
q, is the real exchange rate and by definition is expressed as:
*
. q, == s, + P, - P,
33 Note that this equation differs from the one in Svensson (1998) in that this includes a
short-term real rate instead of a long-term real rateo Additionally, they also differ in that this
íncorporates (in an arbitrary way) the negative effect caused by an increase in the expec-
ted exchange rate risk. It is arbitrary because Morón and Winkelried (2002) do not present
the corresponding underlying mlcrofoundatlons. However, the negative effect upon output
caused by an increase in the expected exchange rate risk can be interpreted as the result
from an anticipated reduction in profits, which in turri reduces the expected availability of
internal funds for investment, and hence causes a fall in output. Note also that from
Svensson (1998),,, is equivalent to _(r n -'/3 ))n + 11" I _ nni'
'/'+1 ,v y t 1+ f+
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where PI ,p;, and SI are the domestic price level, the foreign price level,
and the nominal exchange rate respectively.
Also by definition, the output gap is expressed as:
d "YI == YI - YI (4)
where y: is the aggregate demand, and y;' is the natural rate of output
which is assumed to follow an exogenous stochastic process:
(5)
in which O::; r~ -< 1, and r¡;~1 represents a zero-mean (serially uncorrelated)
productivity shock to the natural rate of output.
The Fisher equation holds:
where i, is the short-term nominal interest rate and represents the central
banks' rnonetary-policy instrument.
The nominal exchange rate (s, ) satisfies the interest parity condition:
(7)
in which i,* isthe foreign nominal interest rate considered to be exogenous
and determined by a Taylor rule:
(8)
where all coefficients are positive.
226 Revista Venezolana de Análisis de Coyuntura
Both foreign output (y:) and inflation (TI;) are also exogenous. Equiva-
lently, for simplicity, both are assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive pro-
cess (AR (1)):
'" '" >1< '"Y'+I = Y,. y, + '7,+\
(10)
where the aboye coefficients are all positive and less than one
(O -< r~ I Y~ -< 1), and the disturbances ('7:+1 and E: :+1 ) are also (by assumption)
i. i: d.
Finally, combining (3) and (7) in order to eliminate the non-stationary nomi-
nal exchange rate, the resulting real interest parity condition is given by:
q'+lf' =q, +i, -TI r+1fl - ( +TI;+lfr -(¡J,
where (¡J, is the endogenous risk premium.
2.2 An Endogenuous Risk Premium
(11)
As in Morón and Winkelried (2002), this paper incorporates an endogenous
risk premium from Cespedes and others (2000) into Svensson's (2000) original
model. In Cespedes and others (2000) as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989), firms'
net worth determines the risk premium. Particularly, the model in Cespedes and
others (2000) represents a general equilibrium model in which wages are sticky (in
terrns of local currency), and firms have dollarized liabilities. In such a framework
the investors' risk premium can be interpreted as an exchange rate risk premium.
Under the aboye mentioned conditions, there is channel through which a real
exchange rate depreciation can become contractionary. As a real exchange rate
depreciation increases the domestic value of foreign liabilities, the net worth of
non-export business firms is reduced. This in turn, increases the risk premium.
However, as a real exchange rate depreciation also reduces the dollar value of
real domestic output, a competitiveness effect is also present. Therefore, the
overall effect of real exchange rate variations is ambiguous. In terms of Cespe-
des and others (2000), a financiaJly robust economy is one in which the net effect
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of °a real exchange depreciation is expansionary. In the opposite case, the eco-
nomy is said to be financiaJly vulnerable.
Under Iiability dollarization, the equilibrium cost of external funding to firms
engaged in investment projects depends on the foreign interest rate (which is
exogenously determined), plus the risk prernium which is determined as follows>:
As before, all coefficients are positive.
From (12), the change in next period's risk premium is explained by three
major factors. Firstly, for a given level of output, an increase in the exports de-
mand (X, ) requires a lower levelof domestic investment, which in turn implies a
lower level of external funding, and therefore a lower risk premium. On the other
hand, a second effect, which in particular can be interpreted as the substitution or
competitiveness effect, implies that a decrease in the dollar value of real output
(resulting from either a reduction in yt or an increase in q, ) requires lower levels
of investrnent, which as well, implies a lower level of external funding, and there-
fore a smaller risk premium.
Finally, the last term in (12) captures the so-called balance sheet effect re-
sulting from an unanticipated depreciation, which causes a reduction in firms net
worth due to an unexpected fall in the dollar value of real output. Thus, the ba-
lance sheet effect can be caused by either a sudden decrease in the value of real
output (firms' real income), or also by an unexpected real exchange rate depre-
ciation which increases the burden of dollarized Iiabilities in terms of domestic
currency. However, in any case, the deterioration of firms' balance sheets in-
creases investors' risk premium.
3'Cespedes and others (2000) assume underdevelopment of the local financial market.
Under such conditíons, firms which have limited resources to auto-finance investment
projects will have to compensate lenders with a larger risk premium. Such a risk premium
represents the difference between the cost of external funding and the opportunity cost of
internal funding. Thus, the risk premium depends inversely on firms' net worth.
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By assuming that exports (XI) are proportional to foreign demand, that is,
exports are a linear function of foreign demand, and that the risk premium is ex-
posed to Ud shocks( ~~ + 1), (12) can be reparameterized as:
The elasticity of the risk premium to the real exchange rate is then given by:
(14)
Following Cespedes and others (2000), in a financia/ly vulnerable economy 'A
is positive implying a lower competitiveness effect (4J2) relative to the balance
sheet effect (4J3 ), in which case a real depretiation is contractionary for the eco-
nomy. Inversely, when'A is negative implying a greater competitiveness effect
(4J2) relative to the balance sheet effect (4J3 ), a real depreciation is expansionary
and hence the economy is financia/ly robusto
For instan ce, consider the case in which the state of the economy requires
the central bank to reduce the interest rate in order to stabilize output. Given such
a reduction in the interest rate, it can be inferred from equation (11) that in order
to maintain the portfolio balance; the real exchange rate must have to depreciate.
Now assume that the economy is financially exposed to real exchange rate
risk, that is that 'ti is positive, and therefore the economy is financía/ly vulnerable.
In such a case, as mentioned before, a current real exchange rate depreciation
causes a net increase in the expected value of next period's risk premium. This is
in turn predetermines next period's fall in output through two different channels
(see equation (2)). Firstly, through the indirect interest rate channel, the expected
increase in next period's risk premium causes an increment in the expected va-
lue of next period's real interest rate (offsetting the effect of the previous interest
rate cut exercised by the central bank) and therefore contributes to the predeter-
mination of next period's output reduction. However, through the direct wealth
channel, the expected increase in next period's risk premiumalso predetermines
a fall in output.
Partial dollarization:. 229
As mentioned before (see footnote 33) the direct wealth channel can be in-
terpreted as an anticipated future reduction in firms' profits, which in turn reduces
the expected future availability of internal funds for investment, and therefore
contributes to next period's output reduction.
Now consider the other case of interest in which a currency-matching rule is
implemented. In such a case, 413 = O implying that A is always negative (given
412 is positive). In other words, it implies that the economy is not financially expo-
sed to real exchange rate risk. This means that in such a case, a real exchange
rate depreciation always reduces next period's risk premium and therefore, pro-
duces an expansionary effect upon next period's output.
In contrast to the previous case, an expected decrease in next period's risk
premium predetermines a rise in next period's output. In this case such a rise in
output is explained by a larger reduction in real interest rates through the interest
rate channel. However, the rise in next period's output is also explained by the
positive effect resulting from the anticipated increase in future firms' profits, which
in turn causes an increment in the expected future availability of internal funds for
investment, and therefore contributes to next period's rise in output (through the
direct wealth channel -see footnote 33).
In short, under a currency-matching rule, and particularly in the case when
the central bank is implementing a policy of low interest rates, the resulting real
depreciation causes a reduction in next period's risk premium. This in turn, rein-
forces the initial interest rate cut, through a further reduction in the expected futu-
re level of the real interest rate and therefore predetermines a rise in next
period's output.
Consider now the case in which the state of the economy requires the central
bank to increase the interest rate in order to reduce inflation. As the increase in
the interest rate causes a real appreciation, in the case of the financially vulnera-
ble economy, the result is a reduction in next period's risk premium. Consequen-
tly, the reduction in next period's risk premium partially offsets the initial rise in
the interest rate (by decreasing the expected value of next period's real rate) and
therefore partially annuls central bank's original effort.
Finally consider again the case in which a currency-matching rule is imple-
mented. As the increase in the interest rate causes a real appreciation, the result
is instead an increase in next period's risk premium. Consequently, the increase
in next period's risk premium again reinforces the initial risein the interest rate
(by increasing the expected value of next period's real rate) and therefore contri-
butes to reinforcing central bank's original effort.
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In short, under a currency-matching rule, and particularly in the case when
the central bank is implementing a policy of high interest rates, the resulting real
appreciation causes an increase in next period's risk premium. This in turn, rein-
forces the initial rise in the interest rate, through a further increase in the expec-
ted future level of the real interest rate and therefore predetermines a decrease
in next period's output reinforcing central bank's original eftort".
DIAGRAM 1. EFFECT OF AN INTEREST RATE POLlCY
UNDER A CURRENCY-MATCHING RULE: COMPARISON WITH
THE CASE OF A FINANCIALLy VULNERABLE ECONOMY
forthefinaneiallyvulnerableeeonomy: qJ'+liI t andtherefore, r..: ? and Y'+I ?
under aeurreney-matehing rule: qJ'+11t ~ and íherefore. r'+1 iI ~ and Y'+I t
The original poliey is reinforeed ~
forlhefinancial/yvulnerableeeonomy: qJ'+I/' ~andtherefore, r,,+I/' ? and Y/+ I ?
underacurreney-matehingrule: qJr+1I, t andtherefore, r'+I/' t, and Y'+I ~
The original poliey is reinforeed ~
Regarding the mechanisms of moneterypolicy, as mentioned before in the
previous section, the model includes realistic lags and imperfect control of infla-
'tion 36 . The c1osed-economy conventional transmission mechanisms for monetary
policy: the aggregate-demand channel and the expectations channel are present.
The exchange rate contributes with other transmission mechanisms through: the
direct exchange rate channel, the aggregate-demand channel, and also through
the effect of variations in the cost of imported inputs. An additional importance of
the exchange rate is that, as an asset price, it responds to a forward-Iooking be-
haviour, which makes expectations about this variable a fundamental mechanism
for the economy.
35See Diagram 1,
36See previous section for details regarding the transmission channels of monetary policy.
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2.3 The 1055 funetion and the optimal poliey
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The central bank's preferences are described by a quadratic (welfare) loss
function a' la Barro-Gordon, in which CPI Inflation and output gap represent the
target variables. As the targets are assumed to coincide with their natural (Iong-
run) equilibrium levels, no inflationary bias is present. The loss function is ex-
pressed as follows:
) 2
L, = TI~- + X y, (15 )
where the parameter X measures the central bank's concern about stabili-
zing output. When the central bank is only concerned about inflation, that is un-
der strict CPI inflation targeting, X is zero. Conversely, under flexible CPI
inflation targeting X is greater than zero.
It is assumed that a fraction w represents the share of imported goods, so
that:
TI~ = (1-W)TI, + wTI( (16)
where TI( is the domestic-currency inflation of imported final goods, which
fulfils:
TII - pi - pi - TI'+ - - TI + q - q1 , 1-1 - , S, S'-I - 1 1 ,-1'
where
I •
p, = PI +SI
Thus, CPI inflation is given by:
(17)
(18)
(19)
The central bank's problem is to choose i, under discretion in order to mini-
mize its intertemporalloss function:
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(20)
to:
where O-< 8 -< 1, implying that in (20), when 8 ---+ 1, the limit is equivalent
E[Lr] =var (Il~)+ Xvar &r)
3.1 Parameters of the model
(21)
The model requires to be solved numerically as the solution cannot be des-
cribed analytically. The parameters from the model are the same presented by
Morón and Winkelried (2002). They estimate the model parameters for both the
financially vulnerable economy andthe financially robust econorny". However, in
order to analyse the effect of a currency-matching, this paper concentrates on
the parameters associated to the financially vulnerable economy in Morón and
Winkelried (2002). Table 2 presents such parameters.
37 Morón and Winkelried (2002) used: Australia and New Zealand as the representatives of
financially robust economies, and Perú and Uruguayas the representatives of financially
vulnerable economies.
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TABLE 2. Parameters of the model
Aggregate Supply (1) Aggregate Demand (2)
a n 0.500 f3y 0.440
al' 0.050 f3r 0.031
a q 0.085 13: 0.352
f3q 0.025
f3qJ 0.148
Risk premium (8) 'External Variables (9), (10) and (13)
0.528 f~ 0.760
0.340 fv· 0.430
0.509 .Yy 0.900
FVEJ8 0.000 .Yn 0.950
1j.!3
GMR39
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As in Morón and Winkelried (2002), in this paper it is assumed that
X = 0.5which implies a reqime of flexible CPI inflation targeting. Moreover, also
as in Morón and Winkelried (2002), the variance of all perturbations has been set
to 0.5 (except in the cases of the aggregate supply and aggregate demand equa-
tions for which it has been set to 1.0). Equivalently, it is assumed that the share
of imported goods in CPI inflation is w = 0.3.
38FVE refers to the case of the financially vulnerable economy.
39CMR refers to the case under a currency-matching rule.
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Revista Venezolana de Análisis de Coyuntura
The Appendix outlines how the model can be presented in a suitable state-
space formo As in Svensson (2000) and Morón and Winkelried (2002), let
XI and YI denote the column vectors of predetermined variables and target va-
riables respectively. Let as well XI denote the vectors of forward-Iooking varia-
bles, and VI the column vector of innovations to the predetermined variables.
I
XI = (ql ,PI ,JII+21I )
( d n * * -r* * f* * ):*): 11 OO f3 (d 11 ) OOO O)'
. VI = cl .n, -111 ,CI ,111,j {lc l + l' 111 'Si.t,srp,l,I1I' r ,(xrJcl + 0." 111-111 ' s , ,0,
As in Svensson (2000) and Morón and Winkelried (2002), let
2 1 = (X; ,x;) be the ve~tor of predetermined state variables and. the forward-
looking variables, where denotes transpose. Denote the dimensions of XI '
XI" YI ,and 2 1 by ni = 15, nz = 3, n 3 = 2, and n = ni + n 2 = 18
respectively. Then the model can be expressed as:
or equivalently as:
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LI=Y; K Y1
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where A is an n Xn (18x18) matrix; B¿ and B¡ are n x l (18x1) column
vectors; Cz is an n 3 Xn (2x18) matrix; C¡ is an n3 xl (2x1) column vector; and
K is an n3 xn3 (2x2) diagonal matrix with all off-diagonal elements being zero,
and with the diagonal: (1, X). See the Appendix for a detailed explanation regar-
ding all matrices.
The solution to the model involves a standard linear stochastic regulator
problernw. The only inconvenience ís'the presence of the term B¡ il + J /1 ; however
this is also resolved in the Appendix. The standard problem is solved in Oudiz
and Sachs (1985), Backus and Driffill (1986), Currie and Levine (1993), and
Svensson (1994 and 1998).
This paper considers the case of discretion. The reason is because it captu-
res better reality. As Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) indicate: "no major central
bank makes any type of binding commitment over the future course of its mone-
tary policy". Additionally, italso reflects the credibility problem associated to ma-
ny emerging market economies.
In the case of discretion, the forward-Iooking variables are linear functions of
the predetermined variables:
where the matrix H is an n2xnI (3x15)endogenously-determined matrix.
The optimal response function is also linear in the predetermined variables:
40The Appendix gives the details on the procedure regarding the linear stochastic regulator
problem.
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where also the matrix / is endogenously-determined with dimension:
1xn¡ (1x15).
Thus, in general, the dynamics of the economy can be summarized as fo-
1I0ws:
X'+I =M¡¡X, +V'+I
x, =H X,
i, =/ X,
where the n Xn (18x18) matrix M is defined by:
and F = (/,0,0,0) is a lx n (1 x18) vector resulting from the addition of
n 2 = 3 zeros to the 1Xn, (1 x15) / (original) vector".
where M and C, are partitioned in relation to X, and x, :
41 The /l, = 3 zeros have been added in order to have a final Ix /l (1x18) vector without affec-
ting the forward-Iooking variables.
Partial dollarization: ... 237
In the case of discretion, and in the presence of forward-Iooking variables,
the solution involves almost all the variables contained in the modeL Given the
fact that all parameters are identical to the ones presented in Morón and Winkel-
ried (2002), the results regarding the financially vulnerable economy coincide
with the ones previously presented by them. Table 3 shows the results corres-
ponding to the case in which a currency-matching rule is implemented in compa-
rison to the case of the financially vulnerable economy.
TABLE 3. Optimal policy response
Economy / Condition IJ , IJ* * *Y, I Y, /,
Financially Vulnerable 1.369 0.067 -0.587 0.432 0.524
Clmency-matching rule 1.392 0.103 -0.568 0.417 0.498
Economy / Condition ep, q/-l IJ ,+1/ 1 q,l,-I Y,II-l
Financially Vulnerable 1.197 -0.411 0.071 -0.291 0.343
Currency-matching rule 0.833 -0.409 0.103 0.000 0.000
The results vary considerably, even though the financially vulnerable econo-
my and the economy under the currency-matching rule share most of the para-
meters from the modeL The unique (and fundamental) exception is ljJ3 which
takes the value of zero under the currency-matching rule. Thus, Table 3 shows
that the optimal policy reaction function becomes slightly more sensitive to chan-
ges in current inflation and output gap when the currency-matching rule is im-
plemented. Additionally, the function also becomes slightly more reactive to
changes in expected inflation when the currency-matching rule is present.
As expected, the reaction function became less reactive to changes in the
risk premium. However, an unexpected result is that under the currency-
matching rule, the policy response function becomes also less reactive to chan-
ges in the foreign interest rateo As anticipated, the coefficients on previous
expectations of current output and real exchange rate are zero. This is due to the
elimination of the balance sheet effect (or equivalently because 3 = O, see
equation 13).
The resulting policy reaction function seems lo exploit the reinforcing proper-
ties of the currency-metcninq rule facilitating the practice of monetary policy. To
illustrate this point, recall from equation (14), that the elasticity of the risk pre-
mium to the real exchange rate (A ) is always negative in the case of a currency-
matching rule (due toljJ3 =O). Consider the case in which the central bank is
interested in reducing the interest rate in order to stabilize output. The resulting
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real exchanqe rate depreciation causes a decrease in the risk premium. This in
turn, reduces the expected value of next period's real interest rate reinforcing the
initial policy. Equivalently, consider now the case in which the central bank is
interested in increasing the interest rate in order to put inflation back on its co-
rrect path. The resulting real exchange rate appreciation causes an increase in
the risk premium. This in turn, increases the expected value of next period's real
interest rate reinforcing again the initial policy.
Consider again the case in which a sudden fall in output takes place requi-
ring immediate reaction from the central bank. To illustrate the following point,
let's take the elasticity of the risk premium to the output gap:
a(<P'+I - <P, ) =' /lE _ ur = cp
a 't' 2 -r 3y,
(22)
Under the currency-matchíng rule, cP is always positive (due to 4J 3 = O). This
implies that a sudden fall in output reduces next period's risk premium. In turn,
this reduces the expected value of next period's real interest rate, which finally
reinforces the central bank's initial low-interest rate policy. Equivalently, consider
again the case in which an unexpected increase in output takes place, calling for
an immediate reaction from the central bank in order to offset any positive effect
oninflation. The sudden rise in output increases next period's risk premium. This
in turn, increases the expected value of next period's real interest rate reinforcing
again the initial policy.
A fundamental additional result is the gains in terms of welfare observed un-
der the implementation of the currency-matchíng rule. To illustrate this, Table 4
presents the results in terms of the unconditional standard deviation of the major
.macroeconomic variables. Under the currency-matchíng rule, all variables show
a lower volatility.
E[LJ
6.574
5.845
q,
8.888
7.845
Economy / Condition
TABLE 4. Comparison of unconditional standard deviations of major macroeconomic
variables under the optimal policy rule
n e n, { y, 1{ r{
Financially Vulnerable 3.265 2.044 2.189 3.216 5.410
Currency-matching rule 2.985 1.842 2.080 2.835 4.730
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper contributes to previous studies of partially-dollarized economy in-
flation targeting by íncorporatinq the effect of a currency-matching rule. Specifica-
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lIy, such a rule implies imposing a restriction to credit dollarization in order to
guarantee that any form of foreign-currency denominated debt (or bank credit) IS
solely allocated to the export business sector of the economy.
The model in this paper is a small open-economy macroeconomic model. It
was previously merged by Morón and Winkelried (2002) who combined an endo-
genous risk premium from Cespedes and others (2000) with Svensson's (2000)
original model. The model considers lags in the transmission of monetary policy
and imperfect control of inflation. The role of the exchange rate is crucial to both
the transmission of monetary policy and the determination of the risk premium.
The model suggests that under conditions of liability dollarization, currency
mismatches, and incomplete pass-trouqh from the exchange rate to domestic
prices, the effect of a real exchange rate depreciation becomes ambiguous for the
economy, as both a favourable competitiveness effect and an unfavourable balan-
ce sheet effect have an impact upon the risk premium and the aggregate demando
However, under the currency-matching rule, the model shows that real ex-
change rate depreciations become diaphanously expansionary, suggesting an
expected reduction in the fear of fIoating, and therefore a decline in the complex-
ity of the monetary policy. The rationale is simple, under the currency-matching
rule, the economy is not financially exposed to real exchange rate risk, and there-
fore the balance sheet effect is eliminated. Thus, the only remaining effect of a
real exchange rate depreciation is the favourable competitiveness effect.
The paper also compares the optimal monetary policy response and the vo-
latility of the major macroeconomic variables, under the presence of the curren-
cy-matching rule to the case in which the rule is absent. The results are
straiqhtforward. When the economy is not financially exposed to real exchange
rate risk: (i) the volatility of the major economic variables is reduced reflecting
gains in terms of welfare, and (ii) the optimal policy reaction function beco mes
less responsive to changes in the risk premium and the foreign interest rate, and
more reactive to movements in the output gap and expected inflation. The con-
sequences from (i) and (ii) suggest that the advice that calls for liability de-
dollarization in small open economies, should then solely apply to the non-export
business sector.
The resulting policy reaction function seems to exploit the reinforcing proper-
ties of the currency-matching rule, facilitating the practice of monetary policy. For
instance, when the central bank is interested in reducing the interest rate in order
to respond to a sudden fall in output, the currency-matching rule guarantees, that
both the sudden fall in output itself, and the resulting real exchange depreciation,
associated to the low-interest rate policy, will cause a decline in the investors' risk
240 Revista Venezolana de Análisis de Coyuntura
premium. This in turn, will have the effect of reducing the expected value of next
period's real interest rate and therefore reinforces the central bank's initial policy.
Equivalently, when the central bank is interested in increasing the interest ra-
te in order to respond to the increasing inflation resulting from a sudden increase
in output (for instance, due to a demand shock), the currency-matching rule
guarantees, that both the sudden increase in output itself, and the resulting real
exchange rate appreciation associated to the high-interest rate policy, will cause
an increase in the risk premium. This in turn, will increase the expected value of
next period's real interest rate and hence will reinforce the central bank's origi-
nal policy.
Regarding the discussion on currency regimes, this paper presented support
for a sophisticated managed floating regime under partial dollarization. The rea-
son why it has to consider and include the presence of partial dollarization is
because, as previously mentioned, most emerging market economies which still
issue a domestíc currency, exhibit high levels of partial dollarization. However,
such a regime requires the implementation of a currency-matching mechanism,
for instance: the currency-matching rule proposed throughout this paper, or ot-
hers such as the one proposed by Goldstein (2002) involving hedging instru-
ments, and other methods.
As previously mentioned, the reason why a currency-matching mechanism
has to be put into practice is to eliminate the exchange rate risk, and hence the
balance sheet effect. This in turn, will simplify the implementation of monetary
policy, and maintain the benefits of partial dollarization.
This paper has concentrated on the liability side of partial dollarization;
however, further research should see more profound studies regarding the impli-
cations of asset dollarization under imperfect market conditions, and asymmetric
information. Another motivating topie is the study of the role of the global banking
industry in the expansion of international credit. Finally, other appealing areas
might include: the study of the implieations of domestic deposit-dollarizationfor
the growth and stabilization of international reserves, the role of the central
bahk in the setting of the reserve-baeking rate on dollar-deposits, and its effect
upon Iiquidity, exchange rate stabilization, and therefore upon overall macroe-
conomic stability.
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APPENDIX
Initially, from rational expectations:
(23)
(24)
Taking the expectations of equation (1) in period t , and solving for:
(1'- a n )0'+3/'
(25)
After finding the appropriate expressions for Y,-I/, and Q'+2/t' and substitu-
ting into (25):
(1-a n ) O t+3 / t = (1+~r +aq)O t+2 / t -(a n +~q +aq)O t+1/ t +
(- ay~y + ay~(p\jJ2 - aq\jJJYf +
- ~r + aq)it+1/ t + ~q - aq)i t - ~q + aq)i; +{(- aJ(o:r.: + fJ'P'l/J+ «. V>;, + '1/1 )} Y , +
{(- ay )~q + ~(P\jJ2)- aq (1- \jJ2) }qt +
42See footnote 33.
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{(-aJ(Pqy~)-aqY~ (l+y~ - f~y~)}I1; +
{a" (pq + fJ<p)+ 2aq}4?1 (26)
The matrices corresponding to the following state-space form:
[X ] [X]1+1 = A I +B .X
I
+
1/ 1
XI o II
are given by:
(27)
ro o o o o o o , o o o o o
o /3, -/3.'11, PQ r;l Ay:· +f3"IJ/1 - /3, -(p, +/3,1 o o o -/3., o o o /3, + /3.'11, o /3.
o o y" o o o o o o o o o o o o o
o o Y. o o o o o o o o o o o o
o o JI'lr;, f.:r: o o o o o o o o o o o o
o '11, -'11.' -'11, o , o o o o -'11, o o o '11, -('11. -'11,) o o
o o o o o y: o o o o o o o o o o o
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 1 o o
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
A = o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 1
o o y" o -, -, o o o -, o o o o o 1 o o
o o o o o o o o o 1 o o o o o o o
a" a.l . a,¡YIl O -a" -a, O O O -a'l O O O O O «. O 1-a l ,
O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
O /3, - /3.'11, PQY:\ M:· + /3.'11, -/3. -(p, + /3,,) O O O -/3., O O O O O /3. + /3.'11, O /3.
O O y" O -1 ·1 O O O ., O O O O O 1 O O
O O O O O O O O O , O O O O O O 1 O
A B e D' E F G H I J K L M N o P Q R
where the elements corresponding to the last row are given by:
A=O
B={-ayfJy +a yfJ<p1f2 - aqlf2 }7{1-an
C={-av(P(;r~)-aqy~(l+y~ - f~y~)}7{1-an
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0= {- a):(p;r~ +«», )- «; (¡¡~ r~, + v, )}-ó- {1- an
E={-(pq +aq)}-ó-{1-an}
F={ay (pq + Prp)+ 2aq }-ó- {1- an
G=O
H==O
1=0
J ={- (an+ Pq + «: ) }-ó- {1-an
K=0
L=O
M=O
N=O
0=0
P== {- al' (pq + Prplf/2)- aq (1-lf/2) }-ó- {1- an
Q=O
R={1+Pr +aq }-ó-{1-an
Partial dollarizalion:. 247
O O
O
- ~r
O O
O O
O O
O O
O O
O O
1 O
8 0 = O 8 1 = O
1 O
O O
a q O
O 1
O -~r
1 O
-1 O
~q -aq]+[1- an] ~~r +aJ[1-an]
K = [~ ~] e, ~ [~;
e ~[1 o o o o o o -w o o o o o o o w o ~]z o 1 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
The case of discretion involves a linear regulator problem with forward-
looking variables and expected future controls, which implies choosing ir in pe-
riod t to minimize (20) with 0-< 5 -< 1 and subject to:
(27)
(28)
(29)
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it+1 = /'+1 X t+1 ,and
X'+l =H t+1 X t+ 1
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(30)
(31)
where /'+1 and H t+1 are determined by the decision problem in period t + 1.
Initially, on combining (27) and (30) in order to eliminate the term: i'+I/' gives
the new simplified system:
(32)
where:
where as previously said, F =(/,0,0,0) is a lx n (1x18) vector resulting
from the addition of n2 =3 zeros to the 1XnI (1 x15) / vector.
In order to derive the solution, reca!1 that in the discretionary case, the policy
maker is free to reoptírnize every periodo When the central bank reoptimizes in
every period, it takes private sector's expectations as given. Therefore, private
agents' expectations will necessarily be consistent with actual policy. Given the
fact that the model is. linear-quadratic, the solution in period t +1 gives both, a
valué function which is quadratic in the state variables X;+l Vt+1 X'+l + W\+1
(where V'+I is a positive semidefinite rnatrix, and W1+1 is a scalar); and also a
linear relation between the forward looking variables and the state varia-
bles x t+J =H,+\ X'+l. Private agents form expectations about X'+l accordingly.
The value function of the central bank in time t satisfies the Bellman equation:
PartiaJ doJlarization: ...
s. t. X¡+l/¡ = H'+I X'+I/¡ ,given equation (32) and X¡ .
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where Q == C~KCz d R == C:KCan 1 1
The combination of the two restrictions: xt+1 = H t+1 X t+1 and equation (32);
and the partition of the matrices At ,B o¡ ,Q and U in accordance to
(X;,X;) into:
allow to rewrite (33) as:
where the starred matrices are defined by the following algorithm:
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Finally, the algorithm implies an iteration backwards in time until conver-
qence to the steady-state point (1, H, V) is achieved 43,
43 For further details, see Soderlind P. (1999) or his webpage:
http://home.tiscalinet.ch/paulsoderlind/
